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The purpose of this paper is to review some of the more significant recent
literature concerning the moral status of the preimplantation human embryo or
what some prefer to call the "pre-embryo."
Introduction
The essay by Thomas A. Shannon and Allan Wolter, OFM, in the December,
1990 issue of Theological Studies provides a good summary of the kinds of
arguments used to support the position that the preimplantation human embryo
cannot rightly be regarded as a person. It can thus serve as an introduction to our
inquiry.
The major claims advanced by Shannon and Wolter are the following:
1. The zygote does not possess sufficient genetic information to develop into an
embryo; for this development to occur, essential information must be supplied from the
mother, and this can be done only after implantation.
2. Although the zygote is the beginning of genetically distinct life, it is neither an
"ontological" individual nor necessarily the precursor of one; in fact, the zygote gives rise
to an aggregate or colony of individual lives, each genetically the same and equivalent to
the original zygote. Since this is so, it is impossible to identify the conception of an
"ontological" individual with the completion of fertilization; such conception must
rather be said to coincide with implantation.
3. Even after implantation, the "ontological" individual cannot be regarded as a
human person insofar as the "biological presuppositions" for the rational potential
essential for personal subjects are not yet established; at the earliest such presuppositions
are present only around the eighth week of gestation, because only then is the nervous
system "fully" integrated [in fact, Shannon and Wolter incline to the view that these
"presuppositions" are fully present only around the 26th week of gestation, when
"neural integration of the entire organism has been established"]. 1

The second and third claims made by Shannon and Wolter are hardly novel.
They have been advanced by others for many years. The second, in particular,
has recently been developed in detail by Norman Ford, SOB, and, in my opinion,
been even further developed by Michael Coughlan, while the third claim, a
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variant of the "delayed hominization" hypothesis, has been around for a long
time. But the first claim central to the thesis defended by Shannon and Wolter is
more recent and is contingent upon scientific data and their interpretation. In the
balance of this paper I propose to examine more closely each of these three
claims.
1. Does the Zygote Have Within Itself the Potential to Develop Into an
Adult Human Person?
The first claim made by Shannon and Wolter is that the human zygote does
not have within itself the potential to develop into an adult human person.
According to them, some of the information for such development is absent in the
zygote and is supplied only from the mother after implantation. To support this
claim Shannon and Wolter, non-scientists, appeal to an article by C. A. Bedate
and R. C. Cefalo. Bedate and Cefalo had argued that postimplantation cellular
differentiation and information result from the interaction between embryonic
molecules and molecules supplied by the mother; moreover, they had argued that
prior to this interaction the developing organism is not internally ordered to
become an adult human being and can equally give rise to a nonhuman biological
entity, namely, a hydatiform mole. 2
Ironically, in the very month - December, 1990 - in which Theological
Studies published the Shannon-Wolter article, the Jou17Ul1 of Medicine and
Philosophy carried an important article by the Swiss scientist Antoine Suarez,
written precisely to show that the claims of Bedate and Cefalo (and,
consequently, of Shannon and Wolter) are contradicted, not conftrmed, by
"recent research" on teratomas and hydatiform moles. In fact, Suarez argues in
this article, such research definitively shows that "during pregnancy the embryo
does not receive any message or information from the mother able to control the
mechanisms of development or to produce the type of cellular differentiation
necessary for building the tissues of the new human adult."3 Quite to the contrary,
Suarez contends that recent empirical research supports the conclusion that "the
preimpiantation embryo is the same individual of the human species (the same
human animal) as the adult into whom the preimplantation embryo can in
principle develop. ''I
In short, according to Suarez and in contrast to Shannon and Wolter (and
Bedate and Cefalo), the zygote (and the preimplantation embryo) does indeed
have within itself the potential to develop into an adult human person; no new
molecular information, provided by the mother, is necessary.
Interestingly, the same December, 1990, issue of the Jou17Ull ofMedicine and
Philosophy carried an article by Thomas J. Bole III, a philosopher, written
specifically as a response to Suarez's paper. s For the most part, in his paper Bole
seeks to deny the personhood attributed to the zygote by Suarez on the grounds
that it is (a) not a human individual and (b) not a person. In other words, Bole's
principal reasons for criticizing Suarez's paper are philosophical in nature; they
are, in fact, precisely the same as the second and third claims made by Shannon
and Wolter - claims that will be taken up in more detail later in this paper. With
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the respect to precise issue of whether the zygote has within itself the information
needed to develop into an adult human person Bole's major point is that, while
Suarez is correct in saying that complete hydatiform moles carry chromosomal
aberrations, i.e., they result from organisms that cannot properly be said to be true
human zygotes, it is nonetheless possible for "partial" hydatiform moles, at least
in some cases, to develop from "biologically perfect zygotes."6 Bole concludes
from this that "because the difference between a child and such a mole must be
effected by something in addition to the internal organizational principle of the
zygote, the facts support Bedate and Cefalo [and not Suarez]."7
It is evident that the issue raised by Bole is primarily empirical in character. If,
as he claims (adducing as support a personal communication from James
Wheeler, M.D., Assistant Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Baylor
College of Medicine),8 it is true that in some rare instances a "partial" hydatiform
mole can develop from a properly formed human zygote, it must be possible to
discover the causes. But Bole's conclusion, so it seems to me, is a non sequitur. No
evidence is given to support the conclusion, and it seems at least a priori possible
that environmental factors, possibly "information" from the cells of the mother,
negatively affect subsequent development of the organism, resulting in a "partial"
hydatiform mole. The "facts" in question do not necessarily lead to Bole's
conclusion or support Bedate and Cefalo as opposed to Suarez. More needs to be
known about the alleged facts and their proper interpretation.
2. Is the Preimplantation Embryo an Individual Member of the Human
Species?

The second claim made by Shannon and Wolter is that the zygote and the
preimplantation embryo (or what they prefer to call the "pre-embryo") cannot
be said to be an individual member of the human species. To support this claim
they, in company with others, appeal to the fact that prior to implantation all the
cells deriving from the zygote are "totipotent" and capable of giving rise to
distinct individuals with identical genetic constitution (identical twins). The
phenomenon of twinning, of course, has been cited by many as allegedly
irrefutable proof that an individually distinct human being cannot be said to exist
before implantation. Hence Shannon and Wolter's appeal to the "totipotency" of
the cells derived from the zygote to support their thesis is by no means novel.
But it is important to note that Shannon and Wolter, in developing this part of
their argument, rely heavily on the reasoning set forth in great detail by Norman
M. Ford in his book, When Did I Begin?: Conception ofthe Human Individual In
History, Philosophy and Science. It is therefore appropriate here to examine
Ford's argument and also the way his argument has been further developed by
Michael Coughlan in his book, The Vatican, the Embryo and the Law.
Ford admits that the zygote is a real, biologically identifiable human
individual, but contends that it is not "ontologically" the same as the postimplantation embryo and eventual baby. According to Ford, the phenomenon of
twinning shows that the zygote has an active potentiality to become one or more
human beings.9 Ford claims that, when the first cell division occurs, the individual
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which was the zygote ceases to be. From that point until the primitive streak stage
occurs, each of tht} cells contained within the zona pellucida is a distinct
individual. In other words, from the time of the first cell division until
implantation a colony or army of biologically identifiable human individuals
exists; from this colony one ontologically distinct human individual ultimately
emerges. Ford contends that the ontologically distinct human individual comes
to be at the primitive streak stage because it is only then that we have a tiny
individual with definite shape and recognizable boundaries, a front and back, a
right and a left, a head end and a lower end. lO
The line of reasoning developed by Ford has been further advanced by
Coughlan. According to Coughlan, "from a scientific perspective, the early
embryo presents itself as a dynamic structure of human cells with a wide range of
possibilities. For example, it could develop into one or more human beings ... .
At its earliest stages, the embryo cannot properly be said to be the individual
human being into which it may come to grow, any more than the clay on the
potter's wheel is already a particular pot."ll
Moreover, Coughlan stresses that the embryo, prior to implantation, does not
grow - all cell multiplication up to this point is by the successive subdividing of
material constituting the original cell. What is really in being, consequently, prior
to implantation is a dynamic system of cells, each capable of developing into an
adult human being - yet, according to Coughlan, incapable of growth! Once
implantation takes place cell differentiation begins, the individual cells lose their
totipotentiality, and the growth of the newly formed individual can begin
[Coughlan, however, denies that this human individual is a person insofar as it
does not have a body yet sufficiently organized - with sense organs, a developed
brain, etc. - to serve as the basis for rational activities].12 Coughlan further
suggests an analogy: just as an acorn does not become a tree until it is implanted in
the earth and germinates, so in the generation of human life an individual human
life is not present until the embryo implants into the womb and is capabfe of
growing. 13
What can be said by way of response to the arguments of Ford, Coughlan and
others, who stress the totipotentiality of the individual cells within the developing
preimplantation embryo and point to the phenomena of twinning and of possible
recombination?
Several cogent responses, in my opinion, have been made to this line of
argument. I would like first to note some pertinent observations of Joachim
Huarte, an embryologist at the University of Geneva, regarding the concept of
"totipotentiality" when ascribed to the cells of the preimplantation embryo. As
we have seen, Ford, Coughlan, Shannon and Wolter and others contend that the
individual cells of the preimplantation embryo are "totipotent" and that each
can, in appropriate circumstances, develop into an adult human being. But these
authors affirm, either explicitly or implicitly, that each individual cell within the
preimplantation embryo has an active potential to do so. But, as Huarte notes, the
"totipotentiality" ascribed to these cells must be properly understood. While each
cell can, in a sense, be considered totipotent, "it would nonetheless be false to
consider them as if each were embryos. They can become embryos only if they
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are separated from the original embryo and become independent biological units
or ifthey are artificially severed from it [the original embryo] and are surrounded
with a new zona pellucida. It is thus false to say that 'the unicellular or
pluricellular embryo is a potential individual or totipotent,' because an embryo is
always already in itself an individual of an animal species [the human] from the
earliest stages of its development."14 In other words, individual cells of the
developing preimplantation embryo are not actually totipotent; they are actually
totipotent and capable of developing as new human individuals only after they
have been separated, either naturally or artificially, from the embryo of which
they are a part. As long as they are integrated within that individual embryo, they
must be regarded as its parts; the life they enjoy is the life of the whole human
preimplantation embryo, not an independent life of their own.
Second, I believe that the most cogent response to Ford - and thus to
Shannon and Wolter and, in large measure, to Coughlan - has been provided by
Germain Grisez in his important essay, "When Do People Begin?"
Citing R. Yanagimachi's masterful summary of what is currently known about
mammalian fertilization to the effect that "fertilization in mammals normally
represents the beginning of life for an individual,"ls Grisez pointedly observes
that the evidence does not support Ford's theory that cell division "gives rise to
really distinct individuals until a small army of them form the true human
individual."16 He observes that Ford seeks to lend his thesis some plausibility by
noting that groups of individuals can function toward a common end and that,
therefore, the small army of genetically identical cells assembled in the
preimplantation embryo can do so too. However, as he then continues, Ford
simply ignores a fact about a group of individuals which prevents us from
considering the group as a single individual, namely, the fact that they do not even
form a physical whole. But, as everyone knows, the developing embryo is a
physical whole, undivided in itself.17
Grisez then poses the key question: "Do twinning and so on [recombination,
etc.] by themselves show that the 'ontological' human individual comes to be by a
substantial change at the primitive streak stage?" What he has to say in reply to
this question is worth citing in extenso. He writes:
The phenomena of twinning and chimeras do not. Even Ford does not suggest that aU
zygotes have the active tendency to become parts of chimeras. If aU zygotes had an active
potentiality to become twins [as Ford asserts], they would do so unless some accident
prevented it. Thus, contrary to what Ford asserts (without argument), in those zygotes
which develop continuously as individuals, the facts do not evidence an active
potentiality to develop otherwise. Rather, at most the facts show that aU early embryos
could passively undergo division or recombination.IS

As Grisez, Jerome Lejeune, Benedict Ashley, Edgardo Giovanni, and others l9
have shown many times, the phenomenon of twinning can be accounted for in
terms of an asexual mode of reproduction, similar to cloning. The development
of identical twins in no way requires one to conclude that, prior to twinning, no
individual human being was present. In fact, the phenomenon makes sense only if
there was in being an individual human being to begin with. The fact that an
amoeba, for instance, can split and give rise to two amoebas, in no way compels
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one to the conclusion that there was no amoeba to begin with. Similarly,
recombinaton or the formation of chimeras (if, indeed, this ever occurs in
humans), poses no insuperable difficulties.
3. Is the Preimplantation Embryo Not Only a Human Individual but a
Human Person?

The third claim made by Shannon and Wolter is again not novel. Like Joseph
Donceel and others, they claim that the preimplantation embryo lacks the kind of
an organized body required for the infusion of a spiritual, intellectual soul. Or,
like more secularist authors, they hold that it is absurd to ascribe personhood to
an entity that does not have the capacity to make judgments and free choices
-activities typically associated with persons.
This objection, too, has been answered by many authors, among them Grisez,
Ashley, and Josef Siefert. Here I wish first to call attention to a remarkable article
by Jean de Siebenthal, of the Ecole polytecnique federale de Lausanne
concerning the position of St. Thomas Aquinas, to which appeal is made by such
authors as Donceel, Coughlan, Shannon and Wolter; then I will note Grisez's
critique of this view.
Siebenthal first stresses that for St. Thomas the origin of the human body
coincides with the infusion of an intellectual soul. In other words, for St. Thomas
human flesh gets its being from the human, intellectual soul.20 Since Aquinas
thought, erroneously (relying on the allegedly biological evidence of his day),
that in human generation the male seed was alone the active element, he
concluded that the body first formed from maternal blood by this seed was only
vegetative; later a substantial change occurred and a new body, this time animal
in nature, was formed, to be succeeded finally by a human body, informed by a
human, intellectual soul. But note that for St. Thomas the bodies first generated
were nonhuman in kind. There was, for him, a radical discontinuity among the
bodies successively generated. Siebenthal's point is that Aquinas, were he alive
today and aware of the biological evidence disclosed by modem scientific studies,
would have no problem whatsoever in concluding that the body that comes to be
when sperm and ovum, through their union, cease to be, is that of a member of
the human species. It is indubitably a human body, the body of a human being. If
it is a human body, then its organizing and vivifying principle can only be a
human soul, an intellectual soul. If so, it is a being naturally endowed with the
capacities for making true judgments and free choices, although, of course, these
capacities cannot be exercised until they have been developed. But on his
principles, the being in question is indubitably human precisely because its body is
identifiably human, and no human body can be unless inwardly formed by a
human or intellectual soul. 21
In my opinion, Siebenthal has quite accurately summarized the basic
principles of St. Thomas relevant to this issue. Those contemporary Catholic
authors who appeal to Aquinas's views on "successive" ensoulment, in
Siebenthal's judgment, simply fail to appreciate the relevance of his principles, in
particular, his principle that a human body, to be human, must be infused by a
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human soul, so that one can rightly conclude that, if a particular body is known to
be a living, huflUln body, a living, human person is also present in our midst Thus,
since we know that the body that comes to be at the end of fertilization, when
sperm and ovum cease to be, is human in kind, we can rightly conclude that the
being in question is indeed a human person.
On this matter some arguments elaborated by Grisez are also very pertinent. I
will try to summarize them here.
Grisez first notes that advocates of "delayed hominization" like Donceel [and
now Shannon and Wolter] attribute "personhood" to the developing living being
within the womb once the brain begins to develop. But he goes on to note that
"this beginning of the brain's development is not the bodily basis for intellectual
activities but only its precursor. Now, if this precursor satisfies the requirements
of the hylemorphic theory [to which Donceel and other advocates of this position
appeal], there is no reason why earlier precursors should fail to satisfy it B~t each
embryonic individual has from the outset its specific developmental tendency,
which includes the epigenetic primordia of all its organs. Therefore, the hylemorphic theory does not preclude a human zygote's having a personal soul."22
Moreover, developing the same idea that Siebenthal finds rooted in the
thought ofSt. Thomas, Grisez stresses that what is necessary and sufficient to be a
human person is to be a whole, bodily individual with a human nature. The
normal human zygote is, however, a whole, bodily individual with a human
nature; it is not a potential person which will develop into a person if all goes well.
Rather, it is an actual human individual body "which, unless he or she cease to be
- and this can happen to anyone - will remain the same individual while
developing continuously into an adult man or woman." Grisez then concludes:
"whatever, remaining the same individual, will develop into a paradigmatic
instance of a substantial kind already is an actual instance of that kind."23
Conclusion

In my opinion, the claims made by Shannon-Wolter arid others, attempting to
show that the human zygote and preimplantation embryo into which it develops
is not a human person cannot be sustained when subjected to critical scrutiny.
Both scientific evidence and philosophical arguments support, to the contrary,
the claim that the human zygote is a human being, a person, and that the
preimplantation embryo is (a) the same human individual as the zygote and (b)
the same human individual as the postimplantation embryo, the fetus, the
neonate, the child, the adolescent, the mature adult, the senile adult writing this
paper.
In conclusion, I wish to call attention to the recent and excellent book by
Stephen Schwarz, The Moral Question ofAbortion, insofar as Schwarz develops
in depth and with the marshalling of much evidence and many arguments, the
position defended here. 24
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